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Introduction 
As countries prepare to implement their respective coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) 
vaccination programmes, the Strategic Advisory Group of Experts (SAGE) on Immunization of 
the World Health Organization (WHO) is undertaking a three-step process to provide guidance 
for overall programme strategy as well as vaccine-specific recommendations.  
Step 1: A Values Framework. The WHO SAGE values framework for the allocation and 
prioritization of COVID-19 vaccination (1), issued on 14 September 2020, outlines the 
general principles, objectives and related (unranked) target groups for prioritization of 
COVID-19 vaccines. 
Step 2: Roadmap for prioritizing uses of Covid-19 vaccines (Prioritization Roadmap) (this 
document). To support countries in planning, the Roadmap suggests public health 
strategies and target priority groups for different levels of vaccine availability and 
epidemiologic settings. The Roadmap will be updated, as necessary, to accommodate 
the dynamic nature of the pandemic and evolving evidence about vaccine impact. 
Step 3: Vaccine-specific recommendations. As market-authorized vaccines become 
available, specific recommendations for the use of these vaccines will be issued. These 
recommendations may be updated as additional evidence of effectiveness and safety 
of market-authorized vaccines (as well as other interventions) becomes available, and 
as epidemiologic and other contextual conditions evolve.  
Rationale 
Given the urgency and wide-ranging effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, SAGE has developed 
an approach to help inform deliberation around the range of recommendations that may be 
appropriate under different epidemiologic and vaccine supply conditions. The SAGE consensus 
is that currently available evidence is too limited to allow any recommendations for use of any 
specific vaccine against COVID-19 at this time (7 October 2020). This document should be 
regarded as a Roadmap for planning purposes only. 
 
This Roadmap builds on the WHO SAGE values framework for the allocation and prioritization 
of COVID-19 vaccination. The Values Framework listed over 20 population subgroups that, if 
vaccine use needed to be prioritized because of limited supply, would advance one or more of 
its principles and objectives. The Values Framework did not rank the subgroups in any order. 
Specific priority group recommendations for each vaccine product as it becomes authorized for 
use will require the integration of these ethical principles detailed in the Values Framework 
with evidence and information about: i) the status of the pandemic in the proposed 
implementation area (that is, the epidemiologic setting in terms of the degree of ongoing 
severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) transmission and COVID-19 
burden); ii) the amount and timing of vaccine supply and availability, respectively; iii) specific 
product characteristics of the available vaccine(s); and iv) the benefit–risk assessment for the 
different population subgroups at the time vaccination is being considered for deployment; as 
well as other standard criteria used in developing SAGE recommendations (for example, 
feasibility, acceptability and resource use). These factors, together with the Values Framework, 
should guide the appropriate public health strategy for vaccine deployment of specific 
vaccines.  
 
To assist in developing recommendations for use of vaccines against COVID-19, SAGE proposes 
a Prioritization Roadmap of COVID-19 vaccines that considers priority groups for vaccination 
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based on epidemiologic setting and vaccine supply scenarios. These use cases are also set in 
the context of the overall public health strategy for each epidemiologic setting (Table 1). 
 
This Roadmap is intended to serve as guidance on preparing for vaccine prioritization decisions 
within countries. Although the Values Framework does include the principle of global equity, 
this Roadmap does not directly address global allocation decisions. A COVAX Facility allocation 
mechanism for countries participating in the COVAX Facility has been proposed (2). Fig. 1 
shows how it aligns with this Roadmap and the Values Framework.  
 
Fig. 1. Relationship between various WHO SAGE COVID-19 vaccine-related guidance 
 
 
 
Process of Roadmap development  
The Roadmap builds on the population subgroups identified in the WHO SAGE values 
framework for the allocation and prioritization of COVID-19 vaccination as significant for 
advancing the Framework’s principles and objectives. After prioritization exercises by a 
subgroup of the SAGE Working Group on COVID-19 Vaccines, a draft of the prioritization table 
was developed and then critiqued by the full Working Group that includes the chairpersons of 
all six Regional Immunization Technical Advisory Groups (RITAGS) as well several SAGE 
members. The draft table was then revised and reviewed multiple times. A similar process was 
used to develop the narrative sections of the Roadmap. Prioritization took account of emerging 
modelling information exploring the effectiveness and optimal impact of different vaccination 
strategies and best available epidemiologic information from academic literature as well as 
various surveillance organizations. A penultimate round of review by multiple SAGE members 
resulted in further substantive changes to the Framework, followed by a final review by the full 
SAGE committee.  
Guiding considerations 
The following considerations guided the development of this Roadmap.  
• This Roadmap must remain fully aligned with the WHO SAGE values framework for the 
allocation and prioritization of COVID-19 vaccination that preceded it. 
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• To be useful in driving discussions at regional and national levels, the Roadmap needs 
to be kept as straightforward and concise as possible. 
• The Roadmap may be revisited through i) rolling review as new information becomes 
available; and ii) ongoing dialogue with RITAGs and National Immunization Technical 
Advisory Groups (NITAGs). 
 
Key assumptions 
• The Roadmap assumes any vaccine deployed is fully licensed and has met all the minimal 
or critical criteria in WHO Target Product Profiles (TPP) for COVID-19 vaccines (3). Less 
conclusive evidence on benefit–risk, as expected for an emergency-authorized product, 
might lead to more restricted recommendations. 
• The current degree of uncertainty regarding age-independent vaccine efficacy of any 
specific vaccine was considered (for example, a scenario in which the vaccine is assumed 
to have the same efficacy at all ages, and another scenario in which the vaccine is 
assumed to have much lower efficacy in older adults). However, the Roadmap relies on 
the underpinning assumption, supported by current modelling results, that, given the 
many-fold higher mortality rate among older individuals (4, 5), even a vaccine with 
relatively low efficacy in older adults would not significantly change the 
recommendations for priority use cases in older populations (6–8). If however it were 
determined that vaccine efficacy in older adults relative to other age groups were so low 
that individual protection and public health impact became significantly suboptimal, the 
individuals in older age groups in each scenario would likely be moved to a lower priority 
use case.  
• Similarly, it was assumed that there would not be substantive differences in vaccine 
efficacy in subgroups (for example, people with comorbidities that increase the risk of 
severe COVID-19 such as HIV-positive status).  
• The Roadmap assumes that non-pharmaceutical interventions are in place to varying 
degrees as vaccines are introduced and coverage expands. The Roadmap further 
assumes that vaccine efficacy will not deteriorate if use of non-pharmaceutical 
interventions is relaxed. 
• Although a vaccine’s effect on reducing transmission is an important consideration in the 
recommendations for use, direct evidence of impact on transmission will likely not be 
available when the first vaccines are authorized for use. The Roadmap assumes that at 
some point demonstrated evidence of vaccine effectiveness in reducing transmission will 
be available, sufficient to justify prioritizing vaccination of some groups on the basis of 
their role in transmission.  
• The Roadmap does not account for variation in population seropositivity rates or 
existing degree of protection within countries or communities which may have 
already experienced a high degree of community transmission. 
• Prioritization exercises undertaken for development of this Roadmap did not directly 
take account of severe disease, as the risk of this will be closely correlated with the 
risk of death. Similarly, long-term sequalae from SARS-CoV-2 infection have not been 
taken into account as evidence on chronic morbidity is still emerging. 
 
Epidemiologic setting scenarios 
The epidemiologic setting scenarios used here take into consideration the relative benefits 
and potential risks of vaccination. Moreover, the public health strategy for use of vaccines 
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depends upon the burden of disease and on the local epidemiology, particularly the 
incidence rate of infection in a setting at the time vaccination is being contemplated for 
deployment. The three proposed broad epidemiologic settings are: (i) Community 
Transmission, (ii) Sporadic Cases or Clusters of Cases, and (iii) No Cases (Table 1) (9). 
Vaccine supply scenarios 
As sufficient vaccine supply will not be immediately available to immunize all who could 
benefit from vaccination, three scenarios of constrained vaccine supply were considered: 
a Stage I scenario of very limited vaccine availability (ranging from 1–10% of each 
country’s total population) for initial distribution; a Stage II scenario as vaccine supply 
increases but availability remains limited, (ranging from 11–20% of each country’s total 
population); and a Stage III scenario as vaccine supply reaches moderate availability 
(ranging from 21–50% of each country’s total population). How each of these three 
vaccine supply scenarios could be considered in recommendations for use in priority 
groups is illustrated in Table 1.  
 
The Roadmap recognizes that many countries’ prioritization decisions will be tied, in part 
or in whole, to vaccine distribution through the COVAX Facility. Stages I and II in the 
Roadmap correspond to the Phase 1 supply of up to 20% of each country’s population 
detailed in the latest draft of the WHO Fair allocation mechanism for COVID-19 vaccines 
through the COVAX Facility. The Roadmap’s Stage III scenario aligns with the Allocation 
Framework’s Phase 2 supply of more than 20% population coverage (Annex 1). 
Overall public health strategies by epidemiologic setting and vaccine 
supply stage 
SAGE recommends overall public health strategies, grounded in the Values Framework, for 
each of the three epidemiologic scenarios (Table 1). The strategies accommodate the dynamic 
nature of vaccine supply and epidemiologic conditions in each country. 
 
Community Transmission setting: When vaccine supplies are severely constrained, what is 
feasible to achieve with limited vaccine availability justifies an initial focus on direct reduction 
of morbidity and mortality (Annex 2) and maintenance of most critical essential services, while 
considering reciprocity towards groups that have been placed at disproportionate risks to 
mitigate consequences of this pandemic (for example, front-line health workers). As vaccine 
supplies increase, depending on the vaccine characteristics, the strategy expands to reduction 
in transmission to further reduce disruption of social and economic functions. Special attention 
is paid to functions that disproportionately impact children (see below) and to the reduction of 
morbidity and mortality in disadvantaged groups, in keeping with the principles of the SAGE 
Values Framework. 
 
Sporadic Cases or Clusters of Cases setting: When vaccine supplies are severely constrained, the 
initial focus on direct reduction of morbidity and mortality and maintenance of most critical 
essential services, and reciprocity, remains. However, in contrast with the Community 
Transmission epidemiologic setting, this initial focus is concentrated in locations with high 
transmission or anticipated high transmission. In addition, some vaccine is allocated for 
emergency reserve use for outbreak response or mitigation (for example, for localized 
outbreaks). Special attention to reduction of morbidity and mortality of disadvantaged groups 
in areas of high or anticipated high transmission is maintained. As vaccine supplies increase, 
the strategy expands to substantially control transmission and further reduce disruption of 
social and economic functions. 
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No Cases setting: This epidemiologic setting applies to countries that have managed to stop 
transmission through non-pharmaceutical interventions and border controls. When vaccine 
supplies are severely constrained, the initial focus is on prevention of community transmission 
from importation of cases, and reciprocity to critical workers, particularly front-line health 
workers. As vaccine supply increases, older adults, the highest risk group for severe disease 
and death, are included to minimize harm should epidemic conditions change suddenly. Also, 
as vaccine supply increases, the strategy expands to preserve control of transmission and, if 
possible, to reduce reliance on burdensome non-pharmaceutical interventions.  
Priority uses of COVID-19 vaccines 
The rationale for the inclusion of each prioritized vaccine use case based upon population 
subgroup is anchored in the Values Framework principles and objectives. For each priority 
group, the Values Framework objective(s) that would be supported by prioritizing this 
population for vaccination are indicated by parenthetical abbreviations after the population 
description (for example, A1); the legend that links these abbreviations to the objectives is 
provided below Table 1.  
 
While a detailed explanation of the rationale for each of the priority groups is beyond the 
scope of this document, three examples of rationales are provided in Box 1.  
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Box 1. Three examples of rationales for priority uses of COVID-19 vaccines 
 
Example 1. Health workers at high to very high risk of becoming infected and transmitting SARS-
CoV-2 in the Community Transmission epidemiologic setting 
 
For the Community Transmission epidemiologic setting, health workers at high to very high risk 
of becoming infected and transmitting SARS-CoV-2 are included in Stage Ia. There are three 
reasons, linked to the Values Framework, supporting this prioritization. First, protecting these 
workers protects the availability of a critical essential service in the COVID-19 pandemic 
response. Also, the indirect health effects of the pandemic beyond COVID-19 are likely to be 
much worse if such services are compromised or overwhelmed. Second, evidence suggests 
that health workers are at high risk of acquiring infection and possibly of morbidity and 
mortality (10, 11). There is also a risk of onward transmission to people who are also at high 
risk of serious COVID-19 outcomes. Third, prioritization of these workers is also supported by 
the principle of reciprocity; they play critical roles in the COVID-19 response, working under 
intense and challenging conditions, putting not only themselves but also potentially their 
households at higher risk for the sake of others.  
 
There are also pragmatic reasons for prioritizing health workers at high to very high risk of 
infection. Health workers already interact directly with health systems, which should facilitate 
effective deployment of a vaccine programme, particularly including if two or more doses need 
to be administered. Launching a vaccine programme with a relatively accessible target 
population will allow more time for the development of delivery mechanisms to other priority 
groups.  
 
In a second step (Stage Ib), older adults defined by age-based risk specific to country or region 
are included. 
 
Example 2. Sociodemographic groups at significantly higher risk of severe disease or death  
 
For the Community Transmission epidemiologic setting, sociodemographic groups at 
significantly higher risk of severe disease or death are included in Stage II. The reasons for this 
prioritization are grounded in the principles of equal respect and equity.  
 
In keeping with the overall public health strategy that places an initial focus on direct reduction 
of mortality and morbidity, groups with comorbidities or health states that put them at 
significantly higher risk of severe disease or death are prioritized to Stage II. However, there 
are other groups in the population who may be at just as high a risk of these severe outcomes 
but who are not captured in a prioritization solely by comorbidities. These groups 
disproportionately include those who are systematically disadvantaged with respect to social 
standing and economic and political power. In many contexts, disadvantaged groups are more 
likely to experience a higher burden of infection and consequent COVID-19 because of 
crowded work or living conditions over which they have no effective control (12–15), as well as 
a higher prevalence of background states of poor health that increase their risk of severe 
COVID-19 (16). They may also have less access to appropriate health care necessary for the 
diagnosis of high-risk conditions such as heart failure or chronic kidney disease (17). Some 
individuals in these groups would likely qualify for prioritization if their comorbidities were 
known or ascertainable, but because of inequitable access to health care their conditions often 
will be undiagnosed and untreated.  
 9
Which disadvantaged sociodemographic groups are at significantly higher risk of severe 
disease or death will vary from country to country. In many contexts, the evidence of elevated 
risk for COVID-19 severe disease and death will be lacking or less clear than for the risk factors 
like age or comorbidities. Policy-makers may have to decide which disadvantaged groups are 
likely to be sufficiently burdened by COVID-19 to include in Stage II. While broader efforts must 
be made to reach out and identify risks among disadvantaged groups, these decisions may 
have to be based on reasonable assumptions about differential impact inferred from other 
relevant contexts, including past public health emergencies (18). Table 1 provides examples of 
groups that, depending on the country context, may fall under this prioritization category.  
 
Example 3. Social/employment groups at elevated risk of acquiring and transmitting infection 
because they are unable to effectively physically distance  
 
For the Community Transmission epidemiologic setting, social/employment groups at elevated 
risk of acquiring and transmitting infection because they are unable to effectively physically 
distance are included in Stage III. There is considerable overlap in the groups that should be 
considered in this category and the Stage II sociodemographic groups category just discussed. 
The relevant difference is that for some disadvantaged groups there may not be good reasons 
to conclude that they are at significantly elevated risk of severe disease and death (and thus 
that they do not qualify under Stage II). However, these groups may nevertheless still be at 
increased risk (if not significantly increased risk) of severe COVID-19 due to the reasons related 
to inequity discussed above. Groups that have no choice but to work without physical 
distancing or access to personal protective equipment, or no choice but to live in high-density 
homes in high-density neighbourhoods fall into this category (19, 20). They are disadvantaged 
relative to other groups in the population who benefit more easily and more significantly from 
non-pharmaceutical interventions, both in terms of their own risk and in terms of onward 
transmission to loved ones and co-workers. Incarcerated people also fall into this category, 
although the rationale is somewhat different. Even if the restriction of their liberty is justified, 
that does not justify leaving unaddressed the elevated risk associated with being incarcerated.  
 
In an ideal world, policy-makers could clearly distinguish, based on evidence regarding level of 
risk, which disadvantaged groups fall under Stage II criteria and which under Stage III criteria. 
In the real world, these decisions may have to be made with only limited relevant data. 
Adherence to the principles of equal respect and equity will require a careful assessment to 
ensure that all relevant sociodemographic groups are given equal consideration for both 
Stages. 
 
 
How staging of priority groups relates to group size 
The staging of priority groups is sequential. If there is insufficient vaccine supply to cover the 
priority groups in Stage I, the intention is that all these groups are offered vaccine before 
groups enumerated in Stage II.  
 
With the exception of Stage Ia and Stage Ib, the priority groups within a vaccine supply stage 
are not ordered for prioritization. The assignment of priority groups was based on assumptions 
about the size of different priority groups in high-, middle- and low-income country settings. 
For some priority groups, even estimates of the sizes of different groups were not available. 
Considerable national variation is expected. In some countries, the amount of vaccine 
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projected for a vaccine supply stage may be insufficient to cover all the priority groups 
assigned to that stage and countries will have to prioritize groups within stages.  
 
As an example, consider Stage II in the Community Transmission epidemiologic setting. 
Receiving vaccine supply up to an additional 10% of population coverage in this stage may be 
insufficient to address all the groups assigned to that stage, even if Stage I supply is sufficient 
to cover the groups assigned to Stage I. In deciding which groups in Stage II to prioritize, 
countries may wish to consult the Values Framework for guidance. For example, determining 
which ethical principles are most important to the country at a given time may help identify 
which groups to privilege, if vaccine supply is insufficient to cover all the groups assigned to 
Stage II. 
Gender considerations 
While there is evidence that the risk of severe disease and death is higher in males than in 
females, particularly in older age groups, this difference in risk is diminished when 
comorbidities and other factors are taken into account (4, 21). In many contexts, women are 
disproportionately represented in high-risk occupation groups and they often have direct 
responsibility for caring for elders. Also, in some contexts, women are disadvantaged in terms 
of access to health care, political and social status, and decision-making authority due to social 
structural features in some communities. Prioritizing men or women for vaccination could 
exacerbate underlying gender-based inequities. For these reasons, the Roadmap does not use 
gender to identify prioritized vaccine use cases. The equal respect principle of the Values 
Framework underscores the importance of ensuring that immunization delivery systems place 
equal focus on reaching both men and women in every priority group. 
Addressing pregnant women  
Pregnant women warrant particular consideration, as this group has been disadvantaged with 
respect to the development and deployment of vaccines in previous pandemics. Also, specific 
to COVID-19, evidence is emerging that pregnant women are at elevated risk of serious 
disease, further increased if they have pre-existing comorbidities, and may be at elevated risk 
of adverse pregnancy and birth outcomes as well (22–25). However, it seems likely there will 
be relatively little data about the safety and efficacy of COVID-19 vaccines in these groups 
when Stage I and perhaps even Stage II vaccine supplies become available, making the 
prioritization of pregnant women in these early stages problematic. It is imperative that data 
specific to pregnancy be generated now from, for example, pregnancy-specific safety and 
bridging studies and from participants who inadvertently become pregnant during Phase III 
trials. Vaccine developers and funders should prioritize an assessment of vaccine safety and 
immunogenicity among pregnant women in their clinical development and of safety and 
effectiveness in post-marketing surveillance plans (26). 
 
Of particular concern is that several groups prioritized in the Roadmap, including health 
workers and teachers, are in age groups likely to include significant numbers of women who 
are pregnant (including some who might not be aware of their pregnancy). Guidance on 
pregnant women in groups prioritized for vaccination before these urgently needed safety data 
are available will need to await information about the specific characteristics of the vaccines 
authorized for use, as well as the latest evidence on risks of COVID-19 for pregnant women and 
their children.  
 
The Roadmap currently prioritizes pregnant women as specific groups in Stage III of two 
epidemiologic scenarios. By that time, there should be sufficient evidence to assess whether 
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the net benefit of COVID-19 vaccination for pregnant women (with at least some vaccine 
candidates) outweighs the risks of community-acquired infection and subsequent severe 
COVID-19. It is possible that as evidence accumulates the risks to pregnant women and to their 
children will be judged to be great enough to warrant offering vaccine even in the absence of 
pregnancy-specific evidence about vaccine risk, in which case pregnant women may be added 
as a priority group to Stage II. Similarly, if the pregnancy-specific risks of vaccines (which may 
vary with vaccine product) are determined to be higher than the risks from infection and 
disease, these groups will need to be prioritized for non-vaccine preventive interventions. 
Addressing lactating women 
Historically, lactating women have also been overlooked in pandemic vaccine development and 
response. There is, as yet, no evidence that lactating women or their infants are at elevated 
risk of severe COVID-19. Therefore, they have not been prioritized in the Roadmap. Currently 
there are no data on any risks to the infant from immunization of their lactating mothers. As 
data become available, recommendations on lactating women may be provided for vaccine-
specific recommendations. At least one manufacturer is enrolling lactating women. As with 
pregnant women, it is imperative that evidence on the safety of vaccination in lactating women 
be quickly gathered. 
Addressing children  
Children also warrant specific consideration for at least two reasons. Children are dependent 
on adults and the wider society for their well-being, and setbacks in well-being during 
childhood can have severe negative and sometimes permanent effects that can last a lifetime. 
Although children are less subject to direct morbidity and mortality impacts of infection from 
SARS-CoV-2 when compared to other age groups, they have suffered significantly in other ways 
during the COVID-19 pandemic (27, 28). Physical distancing measures designed to decrease or 
prevent community transmission of SARS-CoV-2 have included withdrawing children from in-
person learning at schools or closing schools altogether. The extent of learning loss and its 
impact on life prospects is expected to be far greater for children living in poverty or in 
otherwise disadvantaged groups. Beyond poor learning and constraints of life prospects from 
disruption in school provision, students have lost social and developmental benefits afforded 
by in-person learning. Schools often also provide a number of additional functions important 
for child health and well-being such as social interactions, meal provision and health services 
including immunizations and shelter from unstable or unsafe home living environments. These 
additional functions are especially important for children living in disadvantaged 
circumstances. Taken together, while all children are being harmed by educational disruptions, 
these effects are hitting the most disadvantaged children hardest, who also have less access to 
distance learning options, widening further existing inequities in child well-being (29). The 
health of all children, and especially low-income children, is also being threatened by COVID-
19-related disruptions to routine immunization and other child health programmes (30–32). 
 
Although the pandemic has greatly impacted child well-being, children themselves are not 
directly prioritized as a population group in Table 1 for two reasons. First, trials of COVID-19 
vaccine candidates in children have not yet been initiated and thus data on safety and efficacy 
in this age group are not expected for some time. Second, as already noted, the low risk of 
severe COVID-19 and death in children does not make them a high priority for direct 
immunization. However, child well-being is addressed within this Roadmap through the 
prioritization of other groups that directly contribute to child well-being. Within the 
Community Transmission epidemiologic scenario, health workers engaged in immunization 
delivery are prioritized to ensure that routine childhood immunization delivery will be safely 
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maintained. Teachers and other adult staff employed in school settings are prioritized within 
this epidemiologic scenario as well to facilitate the full reopening of in-school education.  
Considering comorbidities in vaccine prioritization 
The evidence on specific comorbidities and the increased risk of severe COVID-19 is 
increasing. What is already clear is that i) several comorbidities increase this risk; ii) the 
increase in risk varies between specific comorbidities, and thus equity concerns would 
arise if all comorbidities were to be given similar weight; iii) in many countries, if everyone 
with a comorbidity were to be prioritized in early vaccine supply scenarios, those eligible 
for vaccination would well-exceed supply; and iv) the list of relevant comorbidities will be 
location dependent (4, 21, 33).  
 
Based on these considerations, countries should use relevant local and regional data to 
identify the comorbidities associated with different levels of risk from COVID-19 (for 
example, significant versus moderate risk). One approach is to identify the additional risk 
associated with each comorbidity. Another approach is to prioritize individuals who have 
two or more relevant comorbidities (34). As evidence develops, further guidance from 
SAGE on comorbidities and risk associated with severe COVID-19 will be communicated. 
Moreover, the SAGE Working Group on COVID-19 Vaccines is currently developing further 
guidance on comorbidities that put individuals at significantly higher risk. 
Community engagement, effective communication and legitimacy 
Community engagement and effective communication are essential to the success of 
COVID-19 vaccine programmes. These elements are grounded in the legitimacy principle 
of the Values Framework. This principle requires that prioritization decisions be made 
through transparent processes that are based on shared values, best available scientific 
evidence, and appropriate representation and input by affected parties. Adhering to the 
legitimacy principle is a way to promote public trust and acceptance of a COVID-19 
vaccine. 
 
When applied in practice, countries may embrace the legitimacy principle through 
practical strategies which improve the public’s perception and understanding of vaccine 
development and prioritization processes. Examples of such strategies include i) culturally 
and linguistically accessible communications made freely available regarding COVID-19 
vaccination; ii) recruitment of community opinion leaders to improve awareness and 
understanding of such communications; and iii) Inclusion of diverse and affected 
stakeholder opinions in decision-making. Efforts towards community engagement and 
effective communication are additionally important in subpopulations which may be 
unfamiliar with or distrustful of health-care systems. 
 
As outlined in the Values Framework, there must be no tolerance for personal, financial or 
political conflict of interest or corruption in the prioritization of groups to have access to 
COVID-19 vaccines. In all cases, decision-makers must be able to publicly defend their 
decisions and actions by appealing to reasons that even those who disagree can view as 
reasonable, and not arbitrary or self-serving. Countries should ensure that individuals are 
not able to use their social, financial or political privilege to bypass country-level 
prioritization. 
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Guidance development and decision-making under conditions of 
considerable uncertainty 
The Roadmap was developed with only limited information, under conditions of considerable 
uncertainty. The novelty of the SARS-CoV-2 pathogen and evolving epidemic, economic and 
social circumstances present challenges in making decisions about priority groups for vaccine 
use at this time. Aside from unknown factors of clinical and epidemiologic importance, this 
document makes a number of plausible assumptions regarding vaccine characteristics. If a 
candidate vaccine does not meet these assumptions, the selection of priority groups may 
warrant reconsideration to best fulfil the principles and objectives adopted within the WHO 
SAGE values framework for the allocation and prioritization of COVID-19 vaccination. 
Moreover, nuanced models of various prioritization scenarios are only now starting to emerge, 
and modelling-based evidence is rapidly evolving. For all these reasons, the Roadmap may be 
amended in light of evolving evidence. 
 
Another limitation of the Roadmap is that it is unable to address all possible contingencies. 
Table 2 considers the implications of some changes in circumstances that could affect use of 
the Roadmap. 
Ongoing activities and next steps 
To assess both the usefulness and robustness of the Roadmap in a variety of settings 
worldwide, RITAGs and NITAGs will be engaged in reviewing and critically assessing the 
Roadmap. It is anticipated that refinements of the Roadmap will be needed after the 
engagements of and feedback from national and regional stakeholders, including 
potentially further prioritization within priority groups.  
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Table 1. Epidemiologic setting and vaccine supply scenarios, and recommendations for priority use cases for vaccines against 
Covid-19 in the context of limited supplya 
  
(a) Epidemiologic setting scenario: Community Transmission – defined in Legend 2 
Overall public health strategy for this epidemiologic setting: Initial focus on direct reduction of morbidity and mortality and maintenance of most critical essential 
services; also, reciprocity. Expand to reduction in transmission to further reduce disruption of social and economic functions.  
(A1) (A2) (A3) (B1) (B2) (C1) (C2) (D1) – labels explained in Legend 1 
Vaccine 
supply 
scenario 
Priority groups 
Stage I  
(very 
limited 
vaccine 
availability, 
for 1–10% 
nat. pop.) 
Stage Ia (initial launch): 
 Health workers at high to very high risk of acquiring and transmitting infection as defined by interim guidance forthcoming from WHO.  
(A1) (A3) (D1)  
Stage Ib: 
 Older adults defined by age-based risk specific to country/region; specific age cut-off to be decided at the country level.  
(A1) (C1) 
Stage II 
(limited 
vaccine 
availability, 
for 11–20% 
nat. pop.) 
 Older adults not covered in Stage I.  
(A1) (C1) 
 Groups with comorbidities or health states determined to be at significantly higher risk of severe disease or death. Efforts should be made to ensure that 
disadvantaged groups where there is underdiagnosis of comorbidities are equitably included in this category.  
(A1) (C1) (C2) 
 Sociodemographic groups at significantly higher risk of severe disease or death (depending on country context, examples may include: disadvantaged or 
persecuted ethnic, racial, gender, and religious groups and sexual minorities; people living with disabilities; people living in extreme poverty, homeless and 
those living in informal settlements or urban slums; low-income migrant workers; refugees, internally displaced persons, asylum seekers, populations in conflict 
settings or those affected by humanitarian emergencies, vulnerable migrants in irregular situations; nomadic populations; and hard-to-reach population groups 
such as those in rural and remote areas).  
(A1) (B1) (B2) (C1) (C2) 
 Health workers engaged in immunization delivery (routine programme-specific and COVID-19).  
(A1) (A2) (B2) (C1) (C2) (D1) 
 High-priority teachers and school staff (depending on country context, examples may include: preschool and primary school teachers because of the critical 
developmental stage of the children they teach, teachers of children where distance learning is very difficult or impossible).  
(A2) (A3) (B1) (C1) (C2) 
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Stage III 
(moderate 
vaccine 
availability, 
for 21–50% 
nat. pop.) 
 Remaining teachers and school staff.  
(A2) (A3) (B1) (C1) (C2)  
 Other essential workers outside health and education sectors (examples: police officers, municipal services, child-care providers, agriculture and food workers, 
transportation workers, government workers essential to critical functioning of the state not covered by other categories).  
(A2) (A3) (D1) 
 Pregnant women (see text under Addressing pregnant women). 
(A1) (B1) (B2) (C1) 
 Health workers at low to moderate risk of acquiring and transmitting infection as defined by interim guidance forthcoming from WHO. 
(A1) (A3) (D1) 
 Personnel needed for vaccine production and other high-risk laboratory staff. 
(A1) (A2) (A3) (D1) 
 Social/employment groups at elevated risk of acquiring and transmitting infection because they are unable to effectively physically distance (depending on 
country context, examples may include: people living or working in detention facilities, incarcerated people, dormitories, informal settlements or urban slums; 
low-income people in dense urban neighbourhoods; homeless people; military personnel living in tight quarters; and people working in certain occupations such 
as mining and meat processing). 
(A1) (B1) (B2) (C1) 
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(b) Epidemiologic setting scenario: Sporadic Cases or Clusters of Cases – defined in Legend 2 
Overall public health strategy for this epidemiologic setting: Initial focus on direct reduction of morbidity and mortality and maintenance of most critical essential 
services; also, reciprocity. Expand to substantially control transmission and minimize disruption of social and economic functions.  
(A1) (A2) (A3) (B1) (B2) (C1) (C2) (D1) – labels explained in Legend 1 
Vaccine 
supply 
scenario 
Priority groups 
Stage I  
(very 
limited 
vaccine 
availability, 
for 1–10% 
nat. pop.) 
 Health workers at high to very high risk of acquiring and transmitting infection as defined by interim guidance forthcoming from WHO, in areas with high 
transmission or anticipated high transmission.  
(A1) (A3) (D1) 
 Older adults defined by age-based risk specific to country/region – specific age cut-off to be decided at the country level – in areas with high transmission or 
anticipated high transmission. 
(A1) (C1) 
 Emergency reserve of vaccines for utilization for outbreak response or mitigation (for example, severe localized outbreak). 
(A1) (A2) 
Stage II 
(limited 
vaccine 
availability, 
for 11–20% 
nat. pop.) 
 Health workers at high to very high risk of acquiring and transmitting infection as defined by interim guidance forthcoming from WHO, in the rest of the country. 
(A1) (A3) (D1) 
 Older adults defined by age-based risk specific to country/region – specific age cut-off to be decided at the country level – in the rest of the country 
(A1) (C1) 
 Groups with comorbidities or health states determined to be at significantly higher risk of severe disease or death in areas with high transmission or anticipated 
high transmission. Efforts should be made to ensure that disadvantaged groups where there is underdiagnosis of comorbidities are equitably included in this 
category.  
(A1) (C1) (C2) 
 Sociodemographic groups at significantly higher risk of severe disease or death in areas with high transmission or anticipated high transmission (depending on 
country context, examples may include: disadvantaged or persecuted ethnic, racial, gender, and religious groups and sexual minorities; people living with 
disabilities; people living in extreme poverty, homeless and those living in informal settlements or urban slums; low-income migrant workers; refugees, internally 
displaced persons, asylum seekers, populations in conflict settings or those affected by humanitarian emergencies, vulnerable migrants in irregular situations; 
nomadic populations; and hard-to-reach population groups such as those in rural and remote areas). 
(A1) (B1) (B2) (C1) (C2)  
Stage III 
(moderate 
vaccine 
availability, 
for 21–50% 
nat. pop.) 
 Primary and secondary teachers and school staff in areas with high transmission or anticipated high transmission.  
(A2) (A3) (B1) (C1) (C2)  
 Other essential workers outside health and education sectors (examples: police officers, municipal services, childcare providers, agriculture and food workers, 
transportation workers, government workers essential to critical functioning of the state not covered by other categories) in areas with high transmission or 
anticipated high transmission. 
(A2) (A3) (D1) 
 Social/employment groups at elevated risk of acquiring and transmitting infection because they are unable to effectively physically distance in areas with high 
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transmission or anticipated high transmission (depending on country context, examples may include: people living or working in detention facilities, incarcerated 
people, dormitories, informal settlements or urban slums, low income people in dense urban neighbourhoods, homeless people, military personnel living in tight 
quarters, and people working in certain occupations for example, mining, meat processing). 
(A1) (B1) (B2) (C1) 
 Health workers at low to moderate risk of acquiring and transmitting infection as defined by interim guidance forthcoming from WHO throughout the country. 
(A1) (A3) (D1) 
 Age groups at high risk of transmitting infection by age-based risk specific to country/region; specific age cut-off to be decided at the country level.  
(A1) (A2) 
 Personnel needed for vaccine production and other high-risk laboratory staff. 
(A1) (A2) (A3) (D1) 
 Pregnant women (see text under Addressing pregnant women). 
(A1) (B1) (B2) (C1) 
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(c) Epidemiologic setting scenario: No Cases – defined in Legend 2 
Overall public health strategy for this epidemiologic setting: Initial focus on prevention of community transmission; also, reciprocity. Expand to preserve control 
of transmission and reduce reliance on most burdensome non-pharmaceutical interventions, as well as to protect highest risk individuals in the event of importation-
associated outbreaks.  
(A1) (A2) (A3) (B1) (C1) (C2) (D1) – labels explained in Legend 1 
Vaccine 
supply 
scenario 
Priority groups 
Stage I  
(very 
limited 
vaccine 
availability, 
for 1–10% 
nat. pop.) 
 Health workers at high to very high risk of acquiring and transmitting infection as defined by interim guidance forthcoming from WHO.  
(A1) (A3) (D1) 
 Essential travellers at risk for acquiring infection outside the home country and reintroducing infection upon return to home country (for example, students, 
business travellers, migrant workers, aid workers). Countries should define essential travellers in a way that constrains the ability of economically and politically 
powerful individuals to exploit this priority group to their advantage.  
(A1) (A2) (A3) 
 Border protection staff screening for imported cases and workers for outbreak management (for example, isolation and quarantine managers, immunization 
deployment staff). 
(A1) (A2) (D1)  
 Emergency reserve utilization for focused outbreak response (for example, importation outbreaks). 
(A1) (A2) 
Stage II 
(limited 
vaccine 
availability, 
for 11–20% 
nat. pop.) 
 Health workers at low to moderate risk of acquiring and transmitting infection as defined by interim guidance forthcoming from WHO.  
(A1) (A3) (D1) 
 All travellers at risk for acquiring infection outside the home country and reintroducing infection upon return to home country.  
(A1) (A2)  
 Emergency reserve of vaccines utilization for outbreak mitigation (for example, importation outbreaks).  
(A1) (A2) 
Stage III 
(moderate 
vaccine 
availability, 
for 21–50% 
nat. pop.) 
 Older adults defined by age-based risk specific to country/region; specific age cut-off to be decided at the country level.  
(A1) (C1) 
 Age groups at high risk of transmitting infection by age-based risk specific to country/region, specific age cut-off to be decided at the country level.  
(A1) (A2) 
 Primary and secondary school teachers and staff.  
(A2) (A3) (B1) (C1) (C2) 
 Other essential workers outside health and education sectors (examples: police officers, municipal services, child-care providers, agriculture and food workers, 
transportation workers, government workers essential to critical functioning of the state not covered by other categories).  
(A2) (A3) (D1) 
National equity considerations: Ensure that vaccine prioritization within countries takes into account the disproportionate burdens of the COVID-19 pandemic on social groups 
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that are systematically disadvantaged. (C1) (C2) 
a For individuals in more than one priority group, the highest applicable priority group determines the order in which they should receive COVID-19 vaccine. Current modelling suggests that (given the 
many-fold higher mortality rate among older individuals) age-dependent vaccine efficacy would not significantly change the recommendations for priority use cases in older populations for a strategy 
based on mortality reduction (6–8, 35). If vaccine efficacy in older adults relative to other age groups were so low that individual protection and public health impact became significantly suboptimal, 
the individuals in older age groups in each scenario would likely be moved to a lower rank. 
 
 
Legend 1. Health and equity objectives applied to priority groups 
A. Well-being 
(A1) Reduce deaths and disease burden from the COVID-19 pandemic. 
(A2) Reduce societal and economic disruption (other than through reducing deaths and disease burden). 
(A3) Protect the continuing functioning of essential services, including health services. 
B. Equal respect 
(B1) Treat the interests of all individuals and groups with equal consideration as allocation and priority-setting decisions are being made and 
implemented. 
(B2) Offer a meaningful opportunity to be vaccinated to all individuals and groups who qualify under prioritization criteria. 
C. Equity 
(C1) Ensure that vaccine prioritization within countries takes into account the vulnerabilities, risks and needs of groups who, because of underlying 
societal, geographic or biomedical factors, are at risk of experiencing greater burdens from the COVID-19 pandemic. 
(C2) Develop the immunization delivery systems and infrastructure required to ensure priority populations have access to COVID-19 vaccines, and 
which ensures equal access to everyone who qualifies under a priority group, particularly socially disadvantaged populations. 
D. Reciprocity (D1) Protect those who bear significant additional risks and burdens of COVID-19 to safeguard the welfare of others, including health and other essential workers. 
 
 
Legend 2. WHO transmission categories corresponding to epidemiologic setting scenarios 
Transmission 
categorya 
Definition 
No Cases Countries/territories/areas with no confirmed cases. 
Sporadic Cases Countries/territories/areas with one or more cases, imported or locally detected. 
Clusters of Cases Countries/territories/areas experiencing cases, clustered in time, geographic location and/or by common exposures 
Community 
Transmission 
Countries/area/territories experiencing larger outbreaks of local transmission defined through an assessment of factors including, but not limited to: 
 large numbers of cases not linkable to transmission chains; 
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 large numbers of cases from sentinel laboratory surveillance or increasing positive tests through sentinel samples (routine systematic testing of 
respiratory samples from established laboratories); 
 multiple unrelated clusters in several areas of the country/territory/area. 
Scenario transitions: 
From lower to higher transmission scenario: change to be reported at any time (in the next weekly update). 
From higher to lower transmission scenario: observe during a 28-day period before confirming downgrading of transmission. 
 a Definitions correspond to those used elsewhere in WHO epidemiologic reports, using definitions published in the WHO interim guidance on public health surveillance for COVID-19 published on 7 
August 2020, available here.  
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Table 2. Summary table of the application of the Roadmap under various contingencies 
 
Contingency Change in the application of the Roadmap 
Number and timing of vaccine doses  
Fewer vaccine courses available than expected  The Roadmap is unchanged. Some individuals receive vaccination later than they 
would otherwise. 
Vaccine requires two doses rather than one The Roadmap is unchanged, but some individuals receive vaccination later.  
Vaccine efficacy  
Low vaccine efficacy among older adults or other 
population subgroup 
Current modelling suggests that (given the many-fold higher mortality rate among 
older individuals) age-dependent vaccine efficacy would not significantly change the 
recommendations for priority use cases in older populations (6–8, 35). If vaccine 
efficacy in older adults relative to other age groups were so low that the prioritization 
of older adults was expected to lead to substantially worse overall outcomes in 
number of lives saved, individuals in the older age groups in each scenario would 
likely be moved to a lower rank. Similar considerations apply for individuals with 
comorbidities. 
Low vaccine efficacy in preventing transmission The importance of high coverage of the most vulnerable groups is increased. 
Vaccine safety  
Unanticipated vaccine adverse events Only prioritize individuals or groups for whom vaccine benefits continue to outweigh 
the risks. 
Vaccine uptake  
Vaccine acceptance and uptake is lower than expected The Roadmap is unchanged. Community engagement and risk communication are 
enhanced. 
Number of vaccine types  
More than one vaccine type available The Roadmap is unchanged, but which vaccines are allocated to which population 
groups must take into account the benefits and risks of the vaccine for each 
population subgroup. As authorized vaccines become available, SAGE will make 
vaccine-specific recommendations. 
Epidemic conditions and immune status  
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Epidemic spread is continuing when the vaccine 
becomes available 
The Roadmap is unchanged. Public health messages must continue to stress the need 
for personal protective measures (for example, masks, social distancing, hand 
washing, ventilation). 
Risk profile of a previously identified high-risk group 
changes (for example, due to higher infection rate in 
earlier infection waves than in later waves) 
The general structure of the Roadmap is unchanged. The relevant consideration is risk 
level; if a group is no longer high-risk it should be lowered in priority. However, due to 
equity concerns, as many of these groups are likely to be disadvantaged there must 
be a substantial level of evidence supporting the change, which the immunization 
programme/government should present to justify the change. 
Social, economic and legal contexts   
Some countries do not provide free vaccine access to 
non-citizens or people without documentation of legal 
status 
The Roadmap is unchanged. This practice violates the principle of equity and the goals 
of public health. However, in such cases, other sources of financial support (for 
example, philanthropy, civil society organizations, pharmaceutical companies) should 
be sought to provide vaccination for those individuals.  
Source: Adapted from National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine’s Framework for Equitable Allocation of COVID-19 Vaccine (34), 
with permission.  
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Annex 1. Alignment of the COVAX Facility allocation mechanism and Prioritization Roadmap  
COVAX Facility allocation mechanisma Prioritization Roadmap  
Phase % country population to be covered by vaccine supply  Stage 
% country population to be 
covered by vaccine supply 
Phase 1: Proportional allocation, to cover Tier 1 target 
groups 
Indicative initial tranche: 3% 
Subsequent tranches to reach 20% 
Stage I 1–10% 
Stage II 11–20% 
Phase 2: Weighted allocation based on risk assessment > 20% Stage III 21–50% 
a Note: the COVAX Facility allocation mechanism is still in draft form; further details from the current draft approach are available (here).  
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Annex 2. Reduction of deaths versus reduction of years of life lost 
Years of life lost (YLL) is a measure that is thought by many to integrate a commitment to 
maximizing health benefit with a commitment to promoting equity, where equity is 
understood to include an obligation to ensure that younger people have a fair chance to reach 
later stages of life. There are good ethics arguments for using YLL in many allocation contexts, 
(1, 2) including in this particular pandemic (3). However, the particular epidemiology of the 
current pandemic supports using reducing deaths as a preferred strategy for within-country 
prioritization. The risk of COVID-19-related mortality is extremely high in older age groups 
compared to that in younger age groups. For example, in the United States, the mortality risk 
has been estimated to be 90 times higher among 65–74-year-olds compared to 18–29-year-
olds (4). A similar pattern of significantly higher mortality in older age groups has been 
observed in multiple other countries. The evidence identified to date from modelling analyses 
suggests that using YLL instead of deaths would not substantially alter the priority ranking of 
older people relative to younger people when age is the only dimension considered (5, 6). 
Supplementary unpublished sensitivity analyses prepared for the WHO SAGE Working Group 
on COVID-19 Vaccines support this finding. As priority rankings would not change, expressing 
the policy objective in terms of reduction in the number of deaths rather than YLL has 
programmatic advantages, even if YLL reaches the same conclusions about relative 
prioritization. Reduction of number of deaths is more easily understood by and communicated 
to the general public and is likely to be widely endorsed as an important objective at a time 
when securing public support for and confidence in vaccine programmes is critically important. 
A prioritization approach relying on YLL could be viewed as disrespectful to older people by 
failing to address their disproportionately higher risk of death (7).  
 
YLL also does not address the primary equity challenges in prioritization of COVID-19 vaccines 
within countries and thus the commitment of the Values Framework to equity does not in this 
pandemic require use of YLL. In a pandemic with a mortality pattern similar to seasonal 
influenza where the very young as well as older adults have disproportionately high mortality, 
or that of the 1918 influenza pandemic where young adults were a high-mortality risk group, 
equity considerations could well require a focus on YLL. Also, in the current COVID-19 
pandemic the equity issues in allocation of vaccine between countries are markedly different 
from those in within-country prioritization. Standard expected years of life lost, a measure of 
disease burden often used for cross-national comparative purposes, can help illustrate the 
commitment of the Values Framework to global equity, as long as global inequities in access to 
testing and other surveillance technologies do not unfairly skew assessments of this metric. 
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